Retired Captain Vadim Kulichenko Rossiya, July 11, 2002, p. 6
Conclusion of the governmental commission on the Kursk’s sinking left the chief question unanswered
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Why the torpedo exploded remained a mystery. However, a torpedo cannot explode by itself, I assert it with good reason, since I’m an officer-torpedo-operator and a submariner, possess extensive practice of handling torpedoes, including peroxide ones, stamped 53-57. Being deputy commander of the submarine K-131, in October 1958 I survived a collision with a British submarine at the depth of 60 meters in the Barents Sea. The British collided with us then. It was almost where the Kursk wrecked. Fortunately, the incident caused no casualties. The British have still been silent about that. Having outlived similar circumstances, I’m firmly certain that a collision with a foreign submarine was the original cause of the Kursk’s catastrophe, whereas detonation of the ammunition completed our submarine’s death.
Groups of containers with pressurized air (ten containers in each group), with the capacity of 600 liters each and pressure of 400 atmospheres, were placed in the superstructure of the light hull, above the first compartment as well. Supposing that the enemy hit any of these groups and it exploded, it could be so that the submarine cast deeper, even more if the commander was maneuvering…
An impact with the bottom caused detonation of the ammunition. Did all commission members failed to reflect on the incident which occurred at launching site Baikonur in April 2002 – collapse of an assembly workshop. Containers with pressurized air were damaged there and the blast wave of these destroyed everything. Who has reflected on the fact that we were only shown one pressurized air container from the first compartment of the submarine Kursk?
Now, many have forgotten already (probably deliberately) that the submarine crawled for some interval on the bottom – what else could this be than inertia of the speed the commander set in the maneuvering…
In general, quite often the commissions are urged not to reveal secrets and draw conclusions, to allow avoiding similar incidents, wrecks and catastrophes in the future, and urged instead to hide the truth. The political component is evident, rather than a wish to ascertain the truth. (…)
The tragedy of April 7, 1989 in the Arctic Ocean off Norway, when the unique nuclear submarine Komsomolets was wrecked also has many mysteries. The governmental commission left unanswered the main question of the tragedy: why did a submarine rise to the surface and suddenly sink? Nothing heralded a tragedy: “The commander calmly continued reporting about the situation on board, actions of the crew. All of a sudden, the submarine began sinking quickly. It means the commander and the crew didn’t know something of the submarine’s design features. This “unique” titanic submarine was constructed in the design bureau under Yuri Spasskii, who was included into the governmental commission for investigation of both tragedies. Might this be the source of the more than vague conclusions of the commission?
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